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Abstract 
Cooperation among neighboring local governments determines the final outcome of local economic activity. Every 
local governmental unity tries to maximize its local welfare in order to improve living standards for population. 
Respectively, regions seek to adopt strategies by using available resources so that their productive circuit to be 
competitive. 
This paper aims to research the terms of cooperation and competition between two neighboring local 
governments in order to understand the process of local development. Instruments of Game Theory are employed as 
methodology tools of interaction among economic and societal regional variables. The strategy of each local 
government is determined not only by the level of its economic and social activity, but by the respective level of its 
neighbor, as well. Regional multipliers and social capital are the crucial factors of equilibrium and as a sequence of 
local development.  
 Interaction between the two local governmental units determines crucially the cooperative implementation 
of an investment project. Game’s equilibrium also denotes that interregional bargaining of economic and social 
resources can support win win strategies. In addition the equilibrium of this model can be perceived as a guideline of 
good practices for policy makers and bureaucrats.  
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1. Introduction 
Game Theory has a long contribution in regional and urban studies. Games are broadly used by scholars order to 
study firm’s location (Ellis & Rogers, 2000; Fontini, 2003), investment projects (Wenner, 2003; Sarafopoulos & 
Ioannidis, 2014) and local governments’ operation (Feiock et al, 2005, Ioannidis, 2014; Hazakis & Ioannidis, 2014; 
Sarafopoulos &Ioannidis, 2015). Considering that each local economic space has its very characteristics, the 
research about the strategies of local agents takes receives essential importance.  
The use of games in regional and urban research reveals the diverse options of interaction among actors with 
different interests and therefore shapes the ground for understanding the multiple dimensions of equilibrium 
(Commedatore et al., 2007; Rosser, 2011). Games are adopted as instruments of understanding the options of 
cooperation and conflict among local actors, and sequentially of studying the special dimensions of local 
development (Song & Panayidis, 2012). 
Signal games are proper instruments in this field of research as they determine accurately the strategies that 
maximize the payoffs of actors. The signal which is usually a critical variable, determines not only the possible 
outcomes of equilibrium, but the dominant strategies of actors, as well (Gibbons, 1994; Skyms, 2010; Fudenberg & 
Olszewski, 2011). Under this standpoint, the use of signal games broadens the contribution of Game Theory in 
regional and urban research by integrating the strategies of local actors. Local interests that are transformed into 
strategies of conflict or cooperation feature the very characteristics of each community and therefore disclose 
vibrant information about local milieu (Coulson & Ferrario, 2007)    
 The aim of this paper is to introduce a signal game in the field of local governments’ operation. The notion 
of the game is to study the influence that social capital exercises on local economic activity. Game’s scenario is 
based on the potential cooperation of the two local government units that operate in the same region. The signal of 
the game is the regional multiplier which receives two critical values, high and low.  
 After introduction, in section 2 the basic elements of the game are studied. According to the sufficient 
condition of the signal game, social capital is the critical variable of equilibrium. Lastly in section 3 the conclusions 
of the paper are drawn. 
2. The Game 
2.1 Basic Elements of the Game 
A signal game is introduced in order to understand the investment strategies between two neighboring local 
governments operating in the same region, namely LGi and LGj. Local government i and local government j are the 
only local government units of the region. It is also assumed that LGi is a more prosperous region than LGj is, and 
therefore contributes more to the formation of regional multiplier than LGj does. 
Local governments have two options to cooperate in the materialization of an investment project and or to adopt 
a free rider strategy. The investment project gives to local governments a payoff equal toS . Game’s signal is the 
regional multiplier ( )r of the regional economy that LGi and LGj belong spatially and administratively. It is also 
assumed that LGi is a more prosperous region than LGj is, and therefore contributes more to the formation of 
regional multiplier. Regional multiplies receives two values, i.e. hr which signals regional economies with high 
values of growth and hr  which signals regional economies with low values of growth. The first movement in the 
game belongs to LGi and LGj responses. The game is depicted in figure 1.  
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Figure 1: The Game 
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2.2 Strategies and Payoffs of the Game 
Apart from the abovementioned variables the strategies of the two local governments are also determined 
by ik , jk , a   and E .Specifically ik  denotes the social capital in administrative space of LGi and respectively jk
represents the level of social capital in LGj. Additionally, a    and E are coefficients that refer to the level of social 
capital that stays or/and leaves from a local government unit to other-here from local government i to local 
government j and vice versa. Note that , (0,1)D E  . 
As depicted in figure 1, LGj has two options: to cooperate or not to cooperate. The strategy of the second-and less 
prosperous local government (j) is determined by the level of regional multiplier. In the first case, when regional 
multiplier in high levels LGj has the motive to cooperate in order to receive a part of the more advanced economic 
activity of the territory of LGi. This strategy is associated with a trade off in social capital between the two local 
government units. In this perspective the payoff for LGj’s cooperative strategy equals to 
21 h j iU r [ k (1 )k ]E D S     (2) 
but when the poorer local government chooses the free rider strategy takes 
Nature 
LGi
LGi
LGj
LGj
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22 h jU r k 2
S   (3) 
The relevant payoffs for the prosperous local government is  
11 h i jU r [ ak (1 )k ]E S     (4) 
and on the other end of the spectrum LGi receives 
12 h iU r k 2
S   (5) 
respectively.  
The second route of the game is signalled by the low level of economic activity inside the region which is expressed 
by lr . The affiliation of local government i in the game is indicated by node A, and in that order, the affiliation of 
local government j is figured by node by N. Under these circumstances when LGj selects cooperation strategy 
receives  
23 l j iU r [ k ( 1 )k ]E D S     (6) 
and when does not cooperate  
24 l jU r k 2
S   (7)
Local government i takes 
13 l i jU r [ ak (1 )k ]E S     (8) 
in the cooperation field and   
14 l iU r k 2
S   (9) 
in the free rider option.  
The regional multiplier is the critical variable of game’s equilibrium. The critical standpoint is the establishment of 
sufficient condition for the adoption of cooperative strategy in the materialization of investment project. As LGi is 
the more prosperous region, it is logical to suppose that the interaction between the two local government units is 
determined, except from economic circuit by social variables, as well. This means that the cooperation strategies are 
affiliated with a trade off social resources, i.e. trust, reciprocity and networking between the two local government 
units.  
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3. The game 
2.3. The Sufficient Condition for Cooperation 
The investment project will be run cooperatively when the following condition is valid 
   21 23 22 241 1qU q U qU q U  t                          (10) 
or 
  
 [ (1 ) ] 1 [ (1 ) ] (1 )
2 2h j i l j i h j l j
qr k k q r k k qr k q r kS SE D S E D S      t    (11) 
where q  is the probability of hr and  1 q the probability of lr . 
After some calculations in (11) we have 
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this means that the sufficient condition for equilibrium stands when 
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i
j
k
k a
E  then  
1
2
a E t                                     (14) 
- if i jk kd   then  12a E d               (15)  
            
- if i jk k and 1 22 2
i
j
k
k a
E   then  
1
2
a E                         (16) 
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Looking at the conditions that are generated by (14), (15) and (16), it can be stated that when the poorest local 
government (LGj), has higher levels of social capital than the wealthier region (LGi), then the adoption of 
cooperative strategies by the two local governments is more possible.  
1 2
2 2
i
j
k
k a
E 
This outcome accrues as a consequence to the fact that the difference between D  and E is below 0.5. Taking in 
to account that , (0,1)D E  , it can be understood that big differences in the values of social capital withhold inside 
the local units are associated with higher levels of social capital in LGi. Even in the case of (16), whereas the two 
local government units are governed by same levels of social capital, cooperation is a bit difficult, as LGi ought to 
hold significantly more social capital for her than LGj does.  
4. Discussion 
In recent years the social variables of regional economies have been integrated in the research as critical 
determinants local development. Especially the role of social capital attracted the attention of scholars by focusing 
the role of trust, reciprocity and networking in local economic circuit (Fine, 2001; Kallio et al, 2010). This paper 
tried to contribute in this research field by portraying the abovementioned interaction into a signal game. Equally 
important is the advancement of research in signal games in order the diverse interests of local actors to be classified 
more accurately (Rilley, 2001).  
The scenario of the game is based on a potential cooperation between two local that are the only local 
government units of a region. The cooperation has as desideratum an investment project that can be run by the two 
local government units. In any other case excluding cooperation, the payoffs of both actors are reduced to the half. 
In addition, the healthier local government (LGi) contributes more to the regional economic development and as a 
result signals to the poorest local government (LGj). According to the sufficient condition, the strategy of LGj is 
determined not only by the level of regional multiplier (high or low), but by the bargaining of social capital between 
LGi and LGj, as well. The key element of cooperation lies in the values of social capital that each local government 
unit holds for it. Small deviations between these values favored more the cooperative execution of the investment 
project, when i
k
 is below j
k
and vice versa. 
The notion of the game is that cooperation between two neighboring local governments presupposes a mutually 
beneficiary trade off. In the game presented above, LGi gives to LGj much of its local economic activity. In return, 
LGi holds more social capital for it, than LGj does. This is the case when (15) is valid and LGj gives proportionally 
more social capital than receives as it has already takes the payoffs of regional multiplier. In other word, efficient 
cooperation is an outcome of cognitive swapping.  
The basic limitation of the research is that depicts a model case as lacks statistical evidence. However the model 
tries to summarize the basic options of a local government’ functions by taking into account its economic and social 
operation. Notwithstanding the findings of the research stand in a theoretical level can be perceived as an alternative 
base of local and regional planning. Especially, the adoption of social capital in local government strategies can 
engender improvements in the quality of life for local actors. 
Future research should focus on the very special characteristics of each local government unit so that these 
elements to be included in signal games. Especially in the fields of cooperation among local governments signals 
can contain not only socioeconomic variables, but also political and spatial variables.  





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